Ideas from 'Knowledge First (and reply)' by Timothy Williamson [2014], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)' (ed/tr Steup/Turri/Sosa) [Wiley Blackwell 2014,978-0-470-67209-9]].
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
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19527
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We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge
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19528
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Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do
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19529
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Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification
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A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic
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Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism
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19536
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Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
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19526
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Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances?
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
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19534
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How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning?
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19535
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Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate
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19533
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Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
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19532
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Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items
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